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INTRODUCTION 
When consumers buy counterfeit goods online, few realize 
what interests are at stake.
2
  The increasing sale of counterfeit 
products on the Internet, however, has not gone unnoticed by law 
enforcement or brand owners.
3
  Acting U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Commissioner David V. Aguilar summarized the 
expanding problem: 
 
 2 Dana Thomas, The Fight Against Fakes, HARPER‘S BAZAAR, Jan. 2009, at 69–71, 
available at http://fakesareneverinfashion.com/luxury_report.asp (health concerns related 
to dangerous products and financing terrorism are just two unexpected results). 
 3 CBP, ICE Release Report on 2011 Counterfeit Seizures, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROT. (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national 
/01092012.xml.  
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‗The growth of websites selling counterfeit goods 
directly to consumers is one reason why CBP and 
ICE have seen a significant increase in the number 
of seizures . . . .‘  Although these websites may 
have low prices, what they do not tell consumers is 
that the true costs to our nation and consumers 
include lost jobs, stolen business profits, threats to 
our national security, and a serious risk of injury to 
consumers.
4
 
The companies that are the targets of counterfeiters range from 
luxury goods purveyors to the makers of golf clubs and 
pharmaceuticals.  Unsurprisingly, the most commonly 
counterfeited goods are clothing, accessories, and shoes.
5
  The 
relocation of these counterfeiting businesses from the street to the 
Internet has changed the way trademark right holders pursue the 
parties responsible.  The best strategy is one applied by countless 
law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of illegal enterprises: 
follow the money.  In the Internet counterfeiting era, the money 
leads straight to online service providers (―OSPs‖).  OSPs include 
providers of search or advertising functions,
6
 providers of domain 
name routing services or registration,
7
 central auction house or 
marketplace websites that allow individualized selling platforms,
8
 
payment processors,
9
 and countless other service providers that are 
essential for the success of a commercial enterprise on the Internet. 
Although U.S. Customs and Border Protection (―CBP‖) 
intercepts some of these goods en route to the United States, a 
significantly larger number make it into this country and are sold 
to consumers through websites or brick-and-mortar stores.
10
  The 
 
 4 Id.  
 5 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME: A 
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME THREAT ASSESSMENT 178, Figure 146 (2010), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/tocta-2010.html. 
 6 E.g., GOOGLE, http://www.google.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); YAHOO!, 
http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 7 E.g., GODADDY, http://godaddy.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); NETWORK 
SOLUTIONS, LLC., http://networksolutions.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 8 E.g., AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012); eBAY, 
http://www.ebay.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 9 E.g., PAYPAL, http://www.paypal.com (last visited Feb. 29, 2012). 
 10 CBP, ICE Release Report, supra note 3. 
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Internet is the fastest growing marketplace for these goods.  The 
issues confronting trademark right holders in the Internet 
marketplace for counterfeit goods are unique because the 
relationships between purveyors of counterfeit goods and those 
providing necessary support services are less transparent and less 
personal.  The operation of an online store involves different 
players than an actual storefront including, for example: online 
advertisers, search engines, Internet service providers, Internet-
only payment processers, digital marketplaces and auctions, 
domain-routing services, and more.  The problems trademark right 
holders must confront in the Internet marketplace are what 
strategies will best protect their intellectual property and how to 
deter infringers in a cost efficient way.  The answer in the brick-
and-mortar world was the judicially-created doctrine of 
contributory trademark infringement.  In the online world, 
however, the application of the contributory liability doctrine to 
OSPs presents new challenges for trademark holders and the 
courts. 
This Note seeks to evaluate the standard for contributory 
trademark infringement as applied to OSPs by the courts and to 
examine the differing applications of the doctrine in the pre-
Internet context.    Part I of this Note reviews the theory underlying 
the protection of trademarks and the criminal and civil laws 
prohibiting direct trademark infringement, as they form the basis of 
a secondary claim for infringement.  Next, Part I traces the 
development of the contributory trademark infringement doctrine, 
and the expansion of the doctrine from manufacturers and 
distributors of products to other categories as prescribed by the 
common law.  The doctrine, in its most recent Supreme Court 
iteration, requires that the plaintiff show that a manufacturer or 
distributor (1) supplied a product to a third-party infringer and (2) 
intentionally induced the third-party‘s infringement or knew or 
should have known the infringement was being committed by the 
third-party infringer.
11
 
Part II reviews the two competing standards for service 
providers promulgated by the Ninth Circuit and both the Fourth 
Circuit and the Southern District of New York.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 11 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
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applies a test that requires a provider of services, including OSPs, 
to have direct control and monitoring of the third-party infringer 
for liability to attach.
12
  In contrast, the Southern District of New 
York, and to some degree the Second Circuit, has applied a test 
requiring intentional inducement by the service provider of the 
third-party infringer or actual or constructive knowledge of the 
infringement by the service provider.
13
  The Fourth Circuit adopted 
this test for service providers.
14
  Part II also evaluates the 
difficulties courts have faced in applying the second prong of the 
contributory trademark infringement test promulgated by the 
Supreme Court, which requires some knowledge of the 
infringement and reviews the four standards of knowledge that the 
courts and scholars have applied to service providers in the 
contributory infringement context: reasonable anticipation, specific 
knowledge, willful blindness, and direct control and monitoring.
15
 
Part III argues that the appropriate test for OSPs is that of the 
Southern District of New York and the Fourth Circuit because it is 
most similar to the test expounded by the Supreme Court, and 
conforms to the underlying common law principles of the doctrine.  
This section also argues that the requisite degree of knowledge 
must be broader than specific knowledge and narrower than 
reasonable anticipation in order to preserve the applicability of the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to OSPs.  This new 
standard, consistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent, would 
look to whether the supplier of a service ―designedly enabled‖ the 
infringement.  In other words, the knowledge prong would be met 
where the OSP knew that widespread infringement occurred 
utilizing its service, and that its service by its very design enabled 
that type of infringement. 
Finally, Part IV proposes alternative methods to diminish the 
impact of Internet-based counterfeiting.  These alternatives 
include: a shift in policing, a change in norms regarding 
punishment and damage by infringers, and a restriction of 
infringement through structural systems.   
 
 12 See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 13 See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
14  See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 15 See discussion infra Part II.C.1–4. 
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I. THE REALITIES OF ENFORCING TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
Modern trademark jurisprudence assigns two roles to 
trademark enforcement: protect consumers and protect trademark 
owners.
16
  Trademark owners file civil suits for trademark 
infringement, under both direct and secondary theories of liability, 
to protect their brands from the sale of counterfeit goods.  A direct 
suit can be brought against an individual selling the good directly 
to a consumer, like the operator of a flea market booth selling fake 
purses.  A contributory suit can be brought against a provider of 
goods or services who facilitates the direct sale to customers, such 
as an advertiser who runs online ads encouraging Internet users to 
visit a particular website that sells fake watches.  In order to 
establish a claim for contributory infringement, there must be an 
underlying claim of direct infringement.
17
  The penalties for direct 
infringement arise under both the criminal and civil laws of the 
United States.  In contrast, contributory trademark infringement is 
a judicially-created doctrine, which imposes civil liability on those 
providing goods or services to direct infringers.  The doctrine of 
contributory infringement is closely tied to the underlying acts of 
the direct infringer and the nature of the product or service it 
provides to the direct infringer.  Therefore, a full understanding of 
the entire liability scheme for trademark infringement is necessary. 
In Part I.A, this Note reviews the purposes underlying current 
theories of trademark protection.  In Part I.B, this Note evaluates 
the significant economic and financial pressures associated with 
the sale of counterfeit goods and the legal landscape underlying the 
push to find liability for OSPs in the Internet marketplace.  In Part 
I.C, this Note traces the development of the contributory 
infringement doctrine, and the expansion of the doctrine beyond its 
traditional boundaries. 
 
16 Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781–82 (1992) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982); Rosetta 
Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082, at *44–45 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 
2012). 
 17 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
25:17 (4th ed. 2012).  
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A. The Dual Role of Modern Trademarks 
A trademark is the symbol of good will a product or service 
possesses.
18
  It can be embodied by ―any word, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof . . . [used] to identify and 
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from 
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods.‖19  The courts have increasingly recognized the 
trademark as a device to protect both consumers and brands.
20
  
Consumers rely on the trademark to identify a trusted brand they 
have safely used and enjoyed before.  Trademark owners invest in 
a trademark and continue to provide a quality product or service 
because they alone are able to reap the rewards of that mark.    
When an interloper sells a counterfeit of a trademarked product, 
this usurps both the consumer‘s expectations about the product or 
service and the brand‘s legally sanctioned monopoly over the 
trademark.  The only winner in many instances is the counterfeiter.   
To some extent consumers knowingly purchase counterfeits, 
generally apparel or accessories, as a status symbol because they 
believe their actions are harmless.  Nonetheless, the trademark law 
does not distinguish between consumers‘ desire for a fake good 
versus the real thing in the infringement context.  
B. Direct Infringement and the Economics of Counterfeit Goods 
Individuals prosecuted under direct trademark infringement 
claims are usually the final sellers of counterfeit trademarked 
goods—the shop owner, the individual eBay seller, the street 
peddler, or the website creator.
21
  However, the prosecution of 
these individuals, civilly or criminally, makes an unremarkable 
impact on the tide of counterfeit goods entering the U.S. market.  
The financial benefits derived from the sale of counterfeit goods 
are generally large in comparison to the cost or likelihood of 
getting caught.  One study by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (―OECD‖), estimates that profits from 
the international trade in counterfeit products in 2005 were as high 
 
18  Id. at § 2:15. 
19 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
20    Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 781–82 (Stevens, J., concurring); Ives, 456 U.S. at 855. 
 21 See generally Intellectual Property Cases, DEP‘T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 14, 2012), 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.html#trademark. 
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as $200 billion, greater than the gross domestic product of 
approximately one hundred and fifty state economies.
22
  In a 
follow-up study only two years later, the OECD estimated that 
counterfeit products in international trade were worth an estimated 
$250 billion, or 1.95 percent of total world trade.
23
  Moreover, 
direct infringers are merely a small part of a much larger 
counterfeiting system that utilizes the assistance and services of 
mainstream service providers, such as landlords, shipping 
companies, and online sale platforms, to bring counterfeit goods to 
U.S. consumers.
24
 
The counterfeit goods industry brings in millions of dollars 
worth of counterfeit goods every year; goods that are never 
regulated, taxed, or tested for safety.  In 2005, CBP made 8,022 
seizures of counterfeit goods with a domestic value of more than 
$93 million.
25
  By 2009, the value of goods seized at U.S. borders 
was an estimated $261 million.
26
  The number of items intercepted 
is estimated to be only seven percent of the actual flow of 
counterfeit goods into the country,
27
 which makes the estimated 
value of counterfeit goods a staggering $3.73 billion per year.
28
  
The most common counterfeit goods are clothing, accessories, and 
shoes; but a disturbing number of dangerous and ineffective 
products, including pharmaceuticals, electronics, cosmetics, and 
toys, are brought into the marketplace as well.
29
  Halting the sale of 
 
 22 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting 
and Piracy: Executive Summary, at 15 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3746,en_2649_34173_40876868_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 23 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Magnitude of Counterfeiting and Piracy 
of Tangible Products—November 2009 Update, at 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/23/0,3746,en_2649_34173_44088983_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 24 See Daniel R. Plane, Going After the Middleman: Landlord Liability in the Battle 
Against Counterfeits, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 810, 812–15 (2009). 
 25 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Intercepts More than $11.4 Million Worth of 
Counterfeit Wearing Apparel and Handbags, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT. (Dec. 12, 
2005), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/archives/2005_press_ 
releases/ 122005/12122005.xml.  
 26 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 5, at 180. 
 27 See id. at 181. 
 28 Id.  This number was calculated by the author using the interception estimate and 
value estimate from 2009. 
 29 Id. at 178, Figure 146. 
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these goods is a serious concern for law enforcement and brand 
owners alike. 
The civil penalties for direct trademark infringement arise 
under Section 32 of the Lanham Act.
30
  The elements of a civil 
direct infringement claim require that the party make a ―use in 
commerce‖ of another‘s mark;31 a ―use [that] is likely to cause 
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive;‖32 and that ―the acts 
have been committed with knowledge that such imitation is 
intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive.‖33  The plaintiff must also establish that its mark is 
valid.
34
  The remedies for a successful civil suit may include ―(1) 
defendant‘s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and 
(3) the costs of the action;‖35 attorneys‘ fees,36 statutory damages,37 
injunctive relief,
38
 or the destruction of infringing articles.
39
  
 
 30 Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006). 
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant— 
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for 
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in 
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive; or 
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered 
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable 
imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or 
advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or in 
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising 
of goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable 
in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter 
provided.  Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be 
entitled to recover profits or damages unless the acts have been 
committed with knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used 
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.  
Id. § 1114(1). 
 31 Id. § 1114(1)(a). 
 32 Id. § 1114(1)(b). 
 33 Id. 
 34 N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 552 F.3d 1211, 1218 (11th Cir. 
2008). 
 35 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006). 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. § 1114.  
 39 Id. § 1118. 
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Despite these other plaintiff-friendly remedies, the main goal of 
most right holders is to attain equitable relief in the form of an 
injunction against the counterfeit seller.
40
 
Criminal trafficking in counterfeit goods, services, labels, 
documentation, or packaging is a criminal offense in the United 
States under Title 18 of the U.S. Code.
41
  For criminal liability to 
attach, the government must show that the individual: 
[1] intentionally traffic[ked] or attempt[ed] to traffic 
in goods or services and knowingly used a 
counterfeit mark, or [2] intentionally traffic[ked] or 
attempt[ed] to traffic in labels, patches, stickers, 
wrappers, badges, emblems, medallions, charms, 
boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, 
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature, 
knowing that a counterfeit mark has been applied 
thereto, the use of which is likely to cause 
confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.
42
 
Trafficking in counterfeit goods or services is a felony 
punishable by up to ten years for a first offense or up to two 
million dollars in fines, or both, with further penalties for repeat 
offenders and up to fifteen million dollars in fines for those entities 
other than individuals.
43
  Products that cause bodily harm or death 
carry heavier penalties, and require a lesser mens rea showing of 
recklessness by the seller of the counterfeit goods or services.
44
 
These criminal penalties have been largely ineffective in 
eliminating the wide-scale infringement of consumer goods 
because U.S. laws do not impose significant penalties for 
infringement
45
 and the producers of infringing goods are generally 
 
 40 Marc E. Ackerman & Daren M. Orzechowski, Trademark Infringement and the 
Legal Bases for the Recovery of Economic Damages, in ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HANDS ON GUIDE TO LITIGATION 37 (Daniel Slottje ed., 
2006). 
 41 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2006). 
 42 Id. § 2320(a)(1). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. § 2320(a)(2). 
 45 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., Administration’s White Paper on 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Legislative Recommendations, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
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located outside the United States.
46
  Where the operation includes a 
storefront or offers goods in-person, the individual sellers of 
counterfeit goods are often illegal immigrants working in informal 
trafficking rings with ties to producers or organized crime outside 
the United States.
47
  The arrest of individual sellers has a limited 
impact on the importation of counterfeit goods because the 
individual sellers are generally replaceable due to their illegal 
status.
48
  In addition, trafficking rings can easily utilize mainstream 
shipping methods to move large quantities of infringing product 
into the U.S. or other developed countries‘ markets.49 
Furthermore, even when offenders are arrested they are 
generally not punished to the full extent that the intellectual 
property laws allow.  The Obama Administration‘s White Paper on 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Legislative Recommendations 
(―White Paper‖)50 recommended an increase in the sentencing 
range for intellectual property crimes (less than half of those 
convicted received prison sentences) and for recidivist intellectual 
property crime offenders.
51
  The White Paper noted that 
intellectual property crimes were light on punishment despite the 
high profit margins associated with trademark infringement, 
providing the incentive to sell counterfeit goods, and the 
relationship of counterfeiting activity to organized crime.
52
  It is 
not yet clear if the implementation of these recommendations will 
impact the counterfeit market. 
 
White Paper], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
ip_white_paper.pdf. 
 46 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 5, at 177. 
 47 Id. at 180. 
 48 See id. (―Whatever the role of licit retailers, the bulk of the trade appears to be 
conducted through informal markets and street sales. From places like Warsaw‘s once 
notorious Stadium Market to dozens of municipal flea markets across the United 
Kingdom, thousands of small entrepreneurs flog counterfeit merchandise. Street sales 
people are most often illegal immigrants, often from Africa or Asia. There have been 
many documented cases of illegal immigrants being forced into counterfeit distribution 
by the migrant smugglers.‖).  
 49 UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, supra note 5, at 180, 188 
(counterfeiters utilize licit shipping and trucking enterprises to move their wares in the 
same way that legitimate goods are transported). 
 50 White Paper, supra note 45. 
 51 Id. at 4, 8. 
 52 Id. at 7. 
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The meaningful enforcement of criminal counterfeiting laws 
and civil trademark infringement suits continues to be a challenge 
for both law enforcement and trademark owners.  Trademark 
owners, unlike law enforcement, are able to use a wider variety of 
civil tactics to shut down counterfeiting rings.  By pursuing those 
who facilitate direct infringement under theories of secondary 
liability, brand owners can make the provision of counterfeit goods 
to consumers significantly more difficult and costly for 
counterfeiters and associated parties. 
C. The Doctrine of Contributory Trademark Infringement 
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is one of 
two secondary theories of trademark liability developed by the 
courts to impose liability on third parties who facilitate direct 
infringement.
53
  The doctrine allows trademark owners to file suit 
against those who assist the activities of direct infringers by 
providing goods or services, like OSPs.  This Note will focus 
exclusively on the doctrine of contributory infringement as a 
means to impose liability on third parties and reduce Internet-based 
trademark infringement.  First, this section will examine the 
creation of the contributory infringement doctrine and how it 
interacts with the Lanham Act.  Then, it will review the current 
standard created by the Supreme Court following the Lanham 
Act‘s passage.  Finally, it will review the expansion of the doctrine 
beyond its traditional boundaries. 
1. The Origins of Contributory Trademark Infringement 
In the landmark case of William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,
54
 the Supreme Court first recognized the existence of the 
doctrine of contributory trademark infringement.  In this case the 
manufacturer of Coco-Quinine, a medication containing quinine 
mixed with cocoa for palatability, sought to enjoin the maker of 
Quin-Coco for ―passing off‖ the latter as the former to customers.55  
The alleged passing off occurred when salesmen of Quin-Coco 
 
 53 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 25:17.  The second theory is vicarious liability. Id. § 
25:22. 
 54 265 U.S. 526 (1924). 
 55 Id. at 532. 
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suggested or told druggists to fill prescriptions for Coco-Quinine 
with their product.
56
  The Eli Lilly Court concluded that the 
salesmen, and thereby the company, induced the fraud committed 
by the druggists and harmed the maker of Coco-Quinine.
57
  The 
Court categorized this inducement as an unfair competition 
violation.  The contributory trademark infringement doctrine thus 
stated that ―[o]ne who induces another to commit a fraud and 
furnishes the means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable 
for the injury.‖58 
The Court further framed the unfair competition—or rather 
trademark—violation that occurred by opining that ―[t]he wrong 
was in designedly enabling the dealers to palm off the preparation 
as that of the respondent.‖59  This ―palming off‖ formulation of the 
rule relied upon a series of cases that focused not on inducement, 
but on the party‘s knowledge of the role its product played in 
facilitating the infringing activity.  The test developed in Eli Lilly 
gave rise to liability where the party either induced or designedly 
enabled a third party to commit fraud.  One case the Court relied 
upon in formulating this rule was N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell 
Manufacturing Co.,
60
 which recited the English common law 
liability rule: 
It has been said more than once in this case that the 
manufacturer ought not to be held liable for the 
fraud of the ultimate seller; that is, the shopkeeper 
or the shopkeeper‘s assistant.  But that is not the 
true view of the case.  The question is whether the 
defendants have or have not knowingly put into the 
hands of the retail dealers the means of deceiving 
the ultimate purchasers.
61
 
 
 56 Id. at 530. 
 57 Id. at 530–31. 
 58 Id. (citing Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co. (C. C.), 46 F. 188, 
189 (1891)). 
 59 Id. (citing Coca Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720 (6th Cir. 1912); N.K. Fairbank 
Co. v. R.W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 875, 877–78 (2d Cir. 1896); Enoch Morgan‘s Sons 
Co. v. Whittier-Coburn Co., 118 F. 657, 661 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902)); Lever v. Goodwin, 
[1887]  Ch. 1, 3 (Eng.).   
 60 77 F. 869 (2d Cir. 1896). 
 61 Id. at 878 (2d Cir. 1896) (quoting Lever v. Goodwin, [1887] Ch. 1 at 3 (Eng.)). 
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The knowledge element of the English test would later reappear in 
the Court‘s modern contributory trademark infringement 
jurisprudence.
62
 
The contributory trademark infringement doctrine, despite its 
long common law use, has not yet been codified.  The first federal 
trademark act was created in 1870,
63
 and subsequent revisions have 
preserved the courts‘ ability to apply the contributory infringement 
doctrine.  The current iteration of U.S. trademark law, the Lanham 
Act or the Trademark Act of 1946, continues to preserve the 
courts‘ ability to apply common law doctrine to trademark law.64  
Nonetheless, an act of direct infringement is still necessary, as 
defined by the Lanham Act‘s criminal or civil provisions, for a 
contributory infringement action to commence.
65
  Moreover, 
Congress has repeatedly chosen to leave the doctrine to the courts 
by failing to legislate on the doctrine when amending the 
trademark laws.  In contrast, Congress has passed legislation to 
nullify a different trademark decision made by the Court where 
Congress deemed the decision a violation of the traditional 
contours of trademark law.
66
  Thus, the most recent Supreme Court 
case on contributory trademark infringement, decided in 1982, 
remains the standard for contributory trademark infringement 
today.
67
 
2. Reaffirming the Judicially-Created Doctrine 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the judicially-created doctrine 
of contributory trademark infringement in Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.
68
  In Ives, generic drug 
manufacturers created drug capsules designed to duplicate the 
appearance of a competitor‘s drug capsule for cyclandelate, which 
used the brand name Cyclospasmol as its registered trademark 
 
 62 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 63 S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988) (reviewing the legislative history of the Trademark 
Law Revision Act of 1988). 
 64 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 5 (1946). 
 65 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, § 25:17.  
 66 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 2 (1988). 
 67 See infra Part I.C.2. 
 68 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
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after the drug‘s patent expired.69  Some pharmacists then dispensed 
the generic drug in bottles mislabeled with the brand name drug 
Cyclospasmol.
70
  The trademark owner and drug manufacturer 
alleged that the generic drug manufacturers had induced 
pharmacists through their advertising and promotional materials to 
improperly substitute generic drugs for its product and mislabel the 
bottle as Cyclospasmol.
71
  Ultimately, due to judicial error on the 
part of the lower court, the Supreme Court remanded the case to 
the Second Circuit to determine liability under Section 32 of the 
Lanham Act.  The significance of Ives, however, was not the final 
disposition, but rather the Supreme Court‘s articulation of the test 
for contributory trademark infringement. 
The Court‘s test in Ives differed from earlier iterations of the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine, but preserved the 
overall construction of the test.  The Ives test permits trademark 
holders to pursue civil claims against a manufacturer or distributor 
who ―intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, or . . . 
continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason 
to know is engaging in trademark infringement.‖72  For a 
trademark holder to succeed on this secondary, contributory 
trademark infringement claim, there must first be a claim of direct 
or primary infringement.
73
  In Ives, the intentional mislabeling and 
sale of generics to customers by the pharmacists was the direct 
infringement.  The cases discussed below extended the boundaries 
of the original Ives test, yet relied on the same logic of tying the 
contributory infringer‘s liability to inducement or knowledge. 
3. The Courts Extend the Test Through Common Law 
Principles 
Contributory trademark liability claims may now be brought 
against landlords,
74
 service providers,
75
 franchisors,
76
 and 
 
 69 Id. at 846–48. 
 70 Id. at 849–50. 
 71 Id. at 850. 
 72 Id. at 854. 
 73 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 74 Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
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manufacturers or distributors.
77
  The justifications for extending 
liability to these categories have generally depended on common 
law principles of tort liability
78
 or the presence of an agency 
relationship.
79
  In general, the relationship between the infringer 
and the party liable for contributory infringement will be a fact-
specific inquiry aimed at determining whether a threshold level of 
knowledge or intent has been met to attach liability.
80
  Although 
courts have not found the categories to be as straightforward as 
they would seem, the doctrine has expanded based on the growing 
category of common law relationships in which liability may be 
imposed. 
The decisions extending Ives‘s contributory infringement 
doctrine have relied on the reasoning of two cases: Hard Rock 
Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Services, Inc.
81
 from the 
Seventh Circuit and Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.
82
 from 
the Ninth Circuit.  Both cases extended Ives‘s reasoning to apply 
against landlords, where their tenants sold counterfeit products.  To 
do so, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits applied a modified Ives test, 
swapping landlords and flea market operators for the Ives test‘s 
distributors and manufacturers.
83
 
In Hard Rock Cafe, third-party vendors at two flea markets and 
a discount shop sold counterfeit Hard Rock Cafe T-shirts that 
 
 75 Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany II), 600 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 647 (2010); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 
984–85 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 76 Mini Maid Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 
1992). 
 77 Inwood Labs., Inc., v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853–54 (1982). 
 78 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 738 (1938) (―One who induces or aids 
persons who purchase goods directly or indirectly from him to market them in such a 
manner as to infringe another‘s trade-mark or trade name infringes it himself.‖).  
 79 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (―Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‗principal‘) manifests assent to another person 
(an ‗agent‘) that the agent shall act on the principal‘s behalf and subject to the principal‘s 
control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.‖). 
 80 See, e.g., Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany I), 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507–13 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (applying a fact-specific knowledge analysis). 
 81 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 82 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 83 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264–65; Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149. 
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infringed the trademarks held by the plaintiff.
84
  The court 
reasoned that the Ives test could be extended to this relationship, 
construed by the court as either a landlord-tenant or licensor-
licensee relationship, because the contributory trademark 
infringement doctrine was a common law species of tort.
85
  
Determining that the common law permitted tort liability against a 
landlord or licensor for the acts of the tenant or licensee, the court 
held that Ives equally applied to landlords or licensors as it did to 
manufacturers or distributors.
86
  The court then turned to the 
second prong of the Ives test, requiring knowledge of infringement.  
Hard Rock Cafe had filed suit without notifying the landlords or 
licensors that the shirts being sold were counterfeit,
87
 but the court 
interpreted Ives so as to permit liability where the landlord was 
―willfully blind‖ to infringement on the premises.88  The court 
equated willful blindness with Ives‘s actual knowledge portion of 
the test.
89
  Finally, the court remanded the case, noting that the 
willful blindness test was the correct standard to apply.
90
 
In Fonovisa, the right holder sued a flea market owner for 
allowing vendors to sell counterfeit recordings violating its 
copyrights and trademarks.
91
  The evidence at trial revealed that 
the trademark holders repeatedly notified the flea market owners of 
the infringements, and police raids of the market had resulted in 
pirated recordings being seized.
92
  Nonetheless, the infringements 
at the market continued and both parties agreed that the owner had 
actual knowledge of the infringements.
93
  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the Court in Ives had ―laid down no limiting 
principle that would require the defendant to be a manufacturer or 
distributor‖94 and relied on Hard Rock Cafe‘s principle of 
extending common tort liability because a ―company is responsible 
 
 84 Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1145. 
 85 Id. at 1149. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 1147. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1149. 
 91 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 260–61 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 92 Id. at 261. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 265. 
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for the torts of those it permits on its premises knowing or having 
reason to know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.‖95  
Combining these principles, the court reversed the lower court‘s 
ruling and found the flea market liable for contributory trademark 
infringement.
96
 
In both cases, the courts determined that Ives had not precluded 
the extension of contributory trademark liability to other instances 
where tort law has generally found secondary liability.
97
  
Following Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa, the contributory 
trademark infringement doctrine has been extended to include a 
number of other common law relationships where liability may 
attach to a third party who knows of or induces infringement.
98
  
For the purposes of this Note, however, the analysis will be 
restricted to understanding the developments that affect the 
liability of OSPs and other service providers.  Part II will address 
the divergent tests and standards developing in the courts as an 
outgrowth of the doctrine‘s extension into situations beyond that of 
a manufacturer or flea-market operator. 
II. DOCTRINAL DICHOTOMIES: FINDING THE TEST AND 
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD FOR CASES OF INTERNET INFRINGEMENT 
Counterfeiting is no longer restricted to the bricks-and-mortar 
world; yet, the law has not fully adapted to this new reality.  Right 
holders, in order to preserve their trademark rights, must continue 
to pursue both direct and secondary infringers who sell goods over 
the Internet or provide necessary Internet-based assistance to 
sellers.  For many rights holders pursuing civil actions, this 
mission has been met with a series of legal obstacles that prevent 
 
 95 Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 
1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted)). 
 96 Id.  
 97 Id. (citing Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1149). 
 98 The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement has also been applied in other 
circumstances that are unimportant to this Note‘s analysis of the doctrine. See, e.g., 
Cartier Int‘l B.V. v. Ben-Menachem, 2008 WL 64005, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2008) 
(home owners and residents of home where counterfeiting occurs openly and provides a 
direct financial benefit); Polo Ralph Lauren Corp. v. Chinatown Gift Shop, 855 F. Supp. 
648, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (landlord-tenant liability for building used as premises to sell 
counterfeit goods). 
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the application of traditional contributory trademark infringement 
theories to the Internet. 
These obstacles arise out of confusion in the courts over (1) 
what test to apply to OSPs and service providers generally and (2) 
what degree of knowledge is necessary to comply with Ives‘s 
second prong—the ―knows or has reason to know‖ element.  This 
section will evaluate this confusion and analyze how it has played 
out in the courts.  First, this section will compare and contrast the 
two predominant tests applied by the Ninth Circuit and the 
Southern District of New York.
99
  Second, this section will explore 
the problems courts have encountered in attempting to define the 
requisite level of knowledge necessary to impose liability. 
A. Differences in the Service Provider Tests 
The service provider tests for contributory trademark 
infringement utilized by the Ninth Circuit and the Southern District 
of New York are derived from the test in Ives.  Both tests impose 
liability for the supply of services where the party intentionally 
induces infringement or knows or has reason to know of 
infringement by the party receiving the services.
100
  The Ninth 
Circuit, however, adopted an additional ―direct control and 
monitoring‖ rule.  Courts in the Southern District of New York and 
the Fourth Circuit adopted a modified Ives test that simply 
switches a service provider for a supplier or manufacturer of a 
product. 
1. The Ninth Circuit‘s ―Direct Control and Monitoring‖ Rule 
The Ninth Circuit in Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network 
Solutions, Inc.
101
 determined that the Ives test could be expanded to 
apply to a service provider, rather than one who ―supplies a 
product.‖102  Lockheed Martin Corp. (―Lockheed‖), an aircraft 
manufacturer, sued the domain name registrar Network Solutions, 
Inc. (―NSI‖) for contributory trademark infringement when it 
 
99  The Second Circuit has not technically affirmed the test, but has applied it in the 
OSP context. 
 100 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 101 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 102 Id. at 984. 
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allowed third parties to register domain names similar to its ―The 
Skunk Works‖ trademark.103  NSI provided a dispute resolution 
procedure for post-registration complaints relating to the violation 
of a registered trademark.
104
  Lockheed sent cease-and-desist 
letters to NSI to stop the third party use of similar domain names 
and to stop third party registration of any variations of its mark.
105
  
NSI denied Lockheed‘s requests because it did not follow the 
required dispute resolution procedure, and Lockheed filed its 
infringement suit.
106
 
Although the Ninth Circuit extended liability to service 
providers, the standard it adopted was different from Ives.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that the test for contributory infringement by 
service providers, rather than a product supplier, requires an 
additional showing—beyond the Ives test—of ―[d]irect control and 
monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe 
the plaintiff‘s mark.‖107  The Ninth Circuit rejected Lockheed‘s 
contributory infringement claim under its ―direct control and 
monitoring‖ rule by comparing NSI to the U.S. Postal Service 
when it provides an address to a specific location and routes mail 
to the individual living there.
108
  The court explained, ―NSI 
translates the domain-name combination to the registrant‘s IP 
Address and routes the information or command to the 
corresponding computer.‖109 
The Ninth Circuit supported its expansion of the Ives test by 
(1) stating that the plain language of Ives applied only to those who 
supply a product, and (2) analogizing to Hard Rock Cafe and 
Fonovisa to find that the ―direct control and monitoring‖ rule was 
necessary for service providers.
110
  Relying on the Hard Rock Cafe 
and Fonovisa courts‘ extension of liability where the common law 
landlord-tenant relationship existed, the court determined that ―the 
extent of control exercised by the defendant over the third party‘s 
 
 103 Id. at 981–83. 
 104 Id. at 982. 
 105 Id. at 983. 
 106 Id.  
 107 Id. at 984. 
 108 Id. at 984–85. 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. 
2012] INTERNET IMMUNITY & TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 947 
 
means of infringement‖ was an important factor ―when measuring 
and weighing a fact pattern in the contributory infringement 
context without the convenient ‗product‘ mold.‖111  The Ninth 
Circuit further commented that a domain-name routing provider 
could not be expected to monitor the Internet.
112
 
2. The Southern District of New York/Second Circuit‘s 
Modified Ives Test 
The Second Circuit in Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc. (Tiffany II),
113
 
applied a different standard than the Lockheed court.  The court‘s 
two prong test is essentially identical to the original Ives test: 
―[F]irst, if the service provider ‗intentionally induces another to 
infringe a trademark,‘ and second, if the service provider 
‗continues to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement.‘‖114  In 
Tiffany II, the jewelry company Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and 
Company (together ―Tiffany‖) alleged that eBay, Inc. (―eBay‖) 
assisted trademark infringers through its advertising and listing 
practices, which allowed counterfeit goods to be sold by third party 
sellers on eBay.
115
  eBay conceded that Ives applied so the Second 
Circuit ―assume[d] without deciding that Ives‘s test for 
contributory trademark infringement governs.‖116  Thus, the 
Second Circuit was not required to and did not expressly adopt the 
modified Ives test as the appropriate standard. 
The district court‘s opinion is therefore helpful in shedding 
light on why the modified Ives test was applied instead of the 
typical Lockheed analysis.  The district court in Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. 
eBay, Inc. (Tiffany I)
117
 simultaneously adopted Lockheed‘s 
analysis and chose not to apply the test to an online marketplace, 
as it categorized eBay.  In adopting Lockheed‘s analysis, Judge 
 
 111 Id. at 984. 
 112 Id. at 985 (citing Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 985 F. 
Supp. 949, 958 (C.D. Cal. 1997)). 
 113 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).  
 114 Id. at 106. 
 115 Id. at 96. 
 116 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 105–06. 
 117 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
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Sullivan reasoned that it was a ―persuasive synthesis of the 
relevant inquiry that the Court must undertake in determining 
whether the provider of a service is potentially liable for 
contributory trademark infringement,‖ while acknowledging that 
the Second Circuit had not yet endorsed any particular standard.
118
  
Then, in an unforeseen twist, the district court found that because 
eBay exercised control over and monitored the site, it was 
analogous to the flea market cases and governed by the modified 
Ives standard applied in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa.
119
  At the 
same time, the court determined that ―eBay clearly falls on the 
‗service‘ side of the product/service distinction,‖120 but did not 
explain why or how this ―service‖ classification removed eBay 
from the purview of Lockheed‘s test for all types of service 
providers.  Applying this modified Ives test, the Tiffany I court 
held for the defendants on the basis of inadequate knowledge of 
infringement.
121
 
The Second Circuit did not acknowledge the divergent 
standards for OSPs created in the Lockheed and Tiffany I decisions 
when it affirmed the lower court‘s application of the modified Ives 
standard.  Thus, the Second Circuit‘s test for contributory 
infringement may or may not be that of the Tiffany I court.  
Ultimately, the Second Circuit did not find eBay liable for 
contributory infringement because it interpreted the ―knows or has 
reason to know‖ prong of Ives to require specific, rather than 
general knowledge of infringing sales on its auction site.
122
  The 
Second Circuit also determined that ―willful blindness‖ could 
supply the knowledge requirement of the test for service providers, 
but that eBay had not been willfully blind in the instant case.
123
  
 While Tiffany II did not expand its holding to include an 
express adoption of the modified Ives test, some courts in the 
Southern District of New York have cited the Second Circuit‘s 
 
 118 Id. at 506 (citing e.g. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 416 
n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). 
 119 Id. at 506–07. 
 120 Id. at 506. 
 121 Id. at 508. 
 122 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 107. 
 123 Id. at 109–10. 
2012] INTERNET IMMUNITY & TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 949 
 
opinion for this standard
124
 or recognized it as the applicable test 
despite this technicality.
125
  Other courts have chosen to apply the 
Lockheed standard in their contributory trademark infringement 
analysis, but incorporate the specific knowledge element required 
by the Tiffany II court.
126
 
More recently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
applied the Tiffany II standard to an OSP in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc.
127
  Rosetta Stone brought suit against Google alleging 
a variety of trademark claims arising out of the sale of Google 
AdWords to third parties selling counterfeit products.
128
  The court 
vacated the district court‘s grant of summary judgment to Google 
on Rosetta Stone‘s contributory trademark infringement claim 
because the evidence at the pleading stage was sufficient to 
establish a question of fact as to whether Google had more than 
generalized knowledge of the infringement.
129
  Significantly, the 
Fourth Circuit made no mention of Lockheed‘s direct control and 
monitoring rule. 
3. Confusion in the Courts 
The divergent legal standards have led to confusion for some 
courts as to the appropriate test to apply in new contexts.
130
  In 
particular, the Internet has proven a fruitful area for new 
interpretations of the doctrine of contributory trademark 
infringement.  Predicting the outcome of any one case is difficult 
 
 124 E.g., GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (citing Tiffany II, 600 F.3d at 106). 
 125 E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (―While the Second Circuit has yet to directly contemplate the validity 
of this modified part of the Ives test, I concur with Judge Sullivan that this is a 
‗persuasive synthesis.‘‖); Ascentive, LLC v. Opinion Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
143081, at *53, n.24 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2011) (―Where, as here, a party such as 
PissedConsumer supplies a service—i.e., hosting a webpage—rather than a product to 
one engaging in trademark infringement, the Second Circuit has not decided definitively 
that [Ives] applies; instead it assumed without deciding that [Ives] applied because the 
[OSP] in that case did not contest Inwood’s application.‖)  
 126 Nomination Di Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 130681, at *9–10, *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010). 
127  2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 7082 (4th Cir. Apr. 9, 2012). 
128  Id. at *11. 
129   Id. at *47–49. 
 130 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 117–19. 
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due to the novel issues presented by Internet cases and the 
difficulties courts face in adapting a doctrine, originally focused on 
the physical world, to intangibles.  As the Second Circuit noted in 
Tiffany II, ―[t]he limited case law leaves the law of contributory 
trademark infringement ill-defined.‖131  Although the Second 
Circuit has not yet affirmed the Tiffany I standard, the use of the 
modified Ives standard by the Southern District of New York and 
the Fourth Circuit, has created a circuit split between the Ninth 
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit, and potentially the Second Circuit 
as well. 
B. The Knowledge Prong 
The split between the tests of the Ninth Circuit and the 
Southern District of New York is inherently tied to the knowledge 
requirement of Ives; the differing standards create varying degrees 
of knowledge that can lead to liability.  The second prong of the 
Ives test, which imposes liability when the alleged infringer 
―continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement,‖132 does not 
define the degree of knowledge required to satisfy this element.  
The current application of the doctrine points to four potential 
levels of knowledge that could lead to liability: reasonable 
anticipation, specific knowledge, willful blindness, or direct 
control and monitoring. 
Although the Ives test seems straightforward in requiring that 
the contributory infringer ―know[] or ha[ve] reason to know‖ of the 
infringement,
133
  the courts have produced varying results in their 
attempts to apply this standard to the actions of service providers 
and OSPs.
134
  Traditionally, the standard could be met when either 
the direct infringer‘s conduct signaled to the third party (providing 
either a product or service) that an infringement was occurring or 
the trademark holder sent notice to the third party that the 
infringement was occurring and that the second party‘s actions 
 
 131 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 132 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
 133 Id.  
 134 See infra Part II.C.1–4. 
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were assisting the infringement.
135
  Determining whether a specific 
service provider has a certain level of knowledge is a fact intensive 
inquiry, however, the greater challenge for the courts has been 
translating Ives‘s knowledge language into a workable standard for 
OSPs and other service providers. 
This section will discuss the various interpretations the courts 
have developed in applying the ―knows or has reason to know‖ 
prong of the Ives test.  First, this section will examine the 
reasonable anticipation standard proposed by the Third 
Restatement of Unfair Competition Law.  Then, it will discuss the 
distinction between specific and general knowledge made by the 
Second Circuit in Tiffany II.  Next, this section will address the 
willful blindness standard applied by the Seventh Circuit in 
Fonovisa and Hard Rock Cafe, and acknowledged by the Second 
Circuit in Tiffany II.  Finally, this section will review Lockheed‘s 
direct control and monitoring standard to determine what level of 
knowledge it requires. 
1. Reasonable Anticipation 
The least stringent interpretation of the ―knows or has reason to 
know‖ prong is the reasonable anticipation standard proposed by 
the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition. 
One who markets goods or services to a third 
person who further markets the goods or services in 
a manner that subjects the third person to liability to 
another for infringement . . . is subject to liability to 
that other for contributory infringement if: 
(a) the actor intentionally induces the third person to 
engage in the infringing conduct; or 
(b) the actor fails to take reasonable precautions 
against the occurrence of the third person‘s 
infringing conduct in circumstances in which the 
infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.
136
 
 
 135 See generally, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 
1996); Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th 
Cir. 1992). 
 136 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995). 
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The Restatement further modifies this rule by stating that the 
―duty to take reasonable precautions, however, arises only when 
the manufacturer or distributor has reason to anticipate that some 
substantial number of infringing sales will otherwise occur.‖137  If 
an actor has a reasonable belief that infringing sales will occur, the 
actor need only take reasonable precautions to prevent the 
infringement.
138
 
Nonetheless, this standard has yet to be applied by any U.S. 
court to an OSP.  The Second Circuit explicitly rejected this 
standard in Tiffany II.
139
  Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ives 
dismissed the ―reasonably anticipate‖ standard of knowledge as 
being ―‗watered down‘ and incorrect,‖ but did not explicitly rule 
on this standard of knowledge.
140
  ―The Court‘s decision, however, 
has not been interpreted to preclude reliance on the ‗reasonably 
anticipate‘ standard in actions at common law.‖141 
In response to Tiffany II, some scholars have emphasized that 
the correct standard should be reasonable anticipation when 
looking at online marketplaces.
142
  In their analysis, these scholars 
rely on cases prior to the Tiffany II decision that suggest that 
generalized knowledge of infringement is a component of a full 
liability analysis, which examines the totality of the 
circumstances.
143
  They conclude that  
[t]he common law roots of contributory liability 
suggest that the ―intermediate scope‖ afforded by a 
negligence standard (―reason to know‖) is the 
historical norm and the standard articulated by Ives.  
Generalized knowledge of widespread tortious 
 
 137 Id. cmt. c.  
 138 Id. 
 139 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 140 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.13 (1982). 
 141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 cmt. b (1995) (citing Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 547 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1982), aff’d, 719 F.2d 56 
(3d Cir. 1983)). 
 142 See David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable Anticipation 
Standard Is the Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the 
Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, ¶ 5 (2011).  Notably, the authors of 
this proposition previously wrote an amicus curiae brief, arguing Tiffany & Co.‘s 
position, submitted to the Second Circuit in the case. Id. n.1. 
 143 Id. ¶ 3. 
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conduct by third parties has long been recognized as 
a basis for common law contributory liability.
144
  
Ultimately, they argue that the liability rule should allow for 
constructive knowledge of infringement and liability based on the 
reasonable anticipation standard.
145
  They do not specifically argue 
that the standard is applicable outside of the online marketplace, 
but do assert that it could be applied to the ―bricks-and-mortar‖ 
world.
146
 
2. Specific Knowledge 
In Tiffany II, the Second Circuit held that eBay was not liable 
for the sales of counterfeit goods conducted by its sellers.  Liability 
did not attach because eBay had only general knowledge of 
infringement and had a removal process in place to take down 
infringing sellers once they were notified by the right holder of 
infringement.
147
  The Second Circuit determined that the ―knew or 
should have known‖ standard of Ives required more than 
―generalized notice‖ of infringement; the contributory infringer 
would need ―[s]ome contemporary knowledge of which particular 
listings are infringing or will infringe in the future.‖148  The 
requirement of specific knowledge is especially important in the 
Internet context because OSPs often provide services to a 
significantly greater number of largely unknown parties than 
would a landlord or distributor. 
Courts that have applied and construed the specific knowledge 
rule have provided little additional commentary on the principle.  
Two cases have held that specific knowledge was not present when 
the notice of possible infringement consisted of an existing 
trademark registration for the infringed mark.
149
  In GMA 
 
 144 Id. ¶ 42. 
 145 Id. ¶ 68. 
 146 Id. ¶ 77. 
 147 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 107–08 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 148 Id. at 107. 
 149 GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(―The only post-Tiffany case in this district to face the issue has held that ‗Plaintiffs‘ 
allegations of knowledge are therefore insufficient to the extent they rely on . . . 
[Plaintiff‘s] federal registration.‘  This Court agrees.‖) (quoting Nomination Di Antonio 
E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130681, at 
*15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010)). 
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Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC,
150
 the court ruled that constructive 
notice from a federal trademark registration is insufficient notice of 
infringement.
151
  Then, the court interpreted Tiffany II‘s specific 
knowledge requirement as being ―indicative of a narrow test 
requiring a significant degree of knowledge.‖  In Nomination Di 
Antonio E Paolo Gensini S.N.C. v. H.E.R. Accessories Ltd.,
152
 the 
Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiff‘s case at the 
pleading stage where the only evidence of specific knowledge was 
the plaintiff‘s trademark registration and a letter sent to the 
defendants before the commencement of the suit notifying them of 
infringement where there was no proof the defendants continued to 
provide services thereafter.
153
   Other cases applying the specific 
knowledge standard have provided little additional commentary on 
the difference between general and specific knowledge.
154
  Thus, 
the courts have left the meaning of specific knowledge vague and 
uncertain outside of the Tiffany II context. 
3. Willful Blindness 
Willful blindness was held by the Seventh Circuit in Hard 
Rock Cafe to meet the requisite degree of knowledge required by 
Ives.  The Second Circuit in Tiffany II reaffirmed the validity of the 
willful blindness standard of knowledge against OSPs.  The court 
explained the willful blindness standard in the context of the online 
marketplace: 
[I]f eBay had reason to suspect that counterfeit 
Tiffany goods were being sold through its website, 
and intentionally shielded itself from discovering 
the offending listings or the identity of the sellers 
behind them, eBay might very well have been 
charged with knowledge of those sales sufficient to 
satisfy [Ives‘] ―knows or has reason to know‖ 
 
150  765 F. Supp. 2d 457.  
151  Id. at 465. 
152  2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130681. 
153  Id. at *16–17. 
 154 See e.g., Coach, Inc. v. Gata Corp., 2011 WL 2358671, at *7–8 (D.N.H. June 9, 
2011). 
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prong. A service provider is not . . . permitted 
willful blindness.
155
 
The willful blindness standard has traditionally satisfied the 
knowledge requirement under Ives,
156
 and apparently satisfies the 
Second Circuit‘s specific knowledge standard.  The Second Circuit 
was careful to reiterate that willful blindness is different than the 
reasonable anticipation standard.
157
 
4. Direct Control and Monitoring 
Lockheed created a new standard for service providers; this test 
transformed the ―knows or has reason to know‖ requirement into a 
far more stringent one by attaching the direct control and 
monitoring requirement.  The Ninth Circuit determined that the 
provision of routing services to domain name registrants who had 
infringed the plaintiff‘s trademark could not be governed by the 
traditional test of Ives.
158
  The court applied this standard because 
it determined that all service providers, and by default OSPs, 
required a different level of scrutiny.
159
  This new standard of 
knowledge required that the party, in addition to meeting the Ives 
knowledge requirement, must have ―[d]irect control and 
monitoring of the instrumentality used by a third party to infringe 
the plaintiff‘s mark.‖160  This test turns the second prong of Ives on 
its head because it eliminates liability for knowledge alone under 
the ―knows or has reason to know‖ prong.   
Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, however, has 
construed Lockheed‘s standard to be less stringent than the Ninth 
Circuit majority in a case applying Lockheed to another OSP.  In 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service Association,
161
 the 
plaintiff owned a number of copyrighted images marked with its  
―PERFECT 10‖ trademark that were sold illegally by other 
 
 155 Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 156 Id. at 110. 
 157 Id. at 110 n.15.  
 158 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984–85 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
159    Id. 
 160 Id. at 984. 
 161 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
956 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:927 
 
websites.
162
  The defendants were payment processors for these 
sites.
163
  The court found that the payment processers lacked the 
requisite knowledge and control because the defendants did not 
have the right to directly stop the activity and the plaintiff failed to 
present facts showing that third parties infringed the trademark.
164
 
The court further explained that the control requirement was not 
met where, as here, the party could simply choose to stop 
processing payments.
165
  A dissenting Judge Kozinski argued that 
the provision of payment processing services to a website selling 
infringing trademarked images met the direct control and 
monitoring standard.
166
  Judge Kozinski reasoned that 
credit cards are directly involved in every infringing 
transaction; not only do they process the payment 
for virtually every sale of pirated images by the 
Stolen Content Websites, they control whether such 
transactions will go forward. This is more than 
enough to establish the ―control and monitoring‖ 
that Lockheed Martin requires for contributory 
trademark infringement.
167
 
Judge Kozinski‘s reasoning has been cited with approval by at 
least one other court where payment processors furnished the 
means to receive payment for infringements.
168
 
III. THE FUTURE OF CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK LIABILITY ON THE 
INTERNET—ONE TEST AND ONE STANDARD OF KNOWLEDGE 
Part III of this Note proposes two solutions regarding the 
diverging standards the courts face in applying contributory 
trademark infringement analysis to OSPs.  First, this part argues 
that the appropriate OSP standard for contributory trademark 
infringement is that of the Tiffany II court, and that the additional 
 
162    Id. at 793. 
163    Id. 
164    Id. at 807. 
165    Id. 
 166 Id. at 822. 
 167 Id.  
 168 E.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 253 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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element applied by the Ninth Circuit in Lockheed is an incorrect 
interpretation of the doctrine.  In addition, this part argues that the 
appropriate degree of knowledge, in the OSP context, cannot 
require either specific knowledge or direct control and monitoring 
for the doctrine to have meaning in the online world.  Instead, the 
knowledge prong of the contributory infringement doctrine must 
be interpreted in light of the common law precedents upon which it 
was formulated. 
A. The Proper Test for OSPs is the Modified Ives Test 
The Ninth Circuit in Lockheed and the Fourth Circuit in 
Rosetta Stone applying Tiffany II‘s test have created a circuit split 
over the proper test to apply to OSPs.
169
  Although the Second 
Circuit has not expressly adopted the Ives standard, presumably it 
will follow its analysis in Tiffany II.
170
  District courts below the 
Second Circuit have continued to apply Lockheed in some 
instances.
171
  The test, however, that is most likely to survive 
judicial scrutiny and adhere to Supreme Court precedent is that of 
Tiffany II, due to its similarity to Ives and to the Supreme Court‘s 
jurisprudence preserving the contributory infringement doctrine‘s 
grounding in tort law.
172
  The Ninth Circuit made a number of 
distinctions in creating its direct control and monitoring rule that 
are inapplicable when the doctrine is used properly.  These 
distinctions focus primarily on whether: (1) goods and services 
should inherently be treated differently and (2) the common law 
underpinning the doctrine ultimately controls the expansion of the 
doctrine or some other principle should determine its expansion. 
 
 169 Compare Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th 
Cir. 1999), with Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 110 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 
(2010). 
 170 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 171 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 172 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982); see generally Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428 (1984) (referring to 
contributory copyright infringement as a tort), Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. 
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (―Infringement, whether direct or contributory, is 
essentially a tort, and implies invasion of some right of the patentee.‖); L‘Aiglon 
Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) (discussing the 
creation of a species of federal tort via the Lanham Act). 
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The Ninth Circuit‘s determination in Lockheed that a service 
provider must inherently be treated differently than a landlord or 
manufacturer is an artificial premise.
173
  Analogizing to the flea 
market line of cases, the court determined that some sort of 
relationship—one of direct control and monitoring—had to exist 
between the infringer and the service provider in order for liability 
to attach.
174
  The Ninth Circuit, however, fails to fully reason out 
why this distinction is necessary based on the extension of liability 
in Hard Rock Cafe and Fonovisa to landlords and licensors.  
Moreover, as demonstrated by Judge Kozinski‘s dissent in Perfect 
10, the rule can be bent to support liability against any number of 
OSPs that do not actually ―directly control and monitor‖ the 
activities of third-parties.  The greatest error in the Ninth Circuit‘s 
test is that, if strictly applied, it would preclude almost any finding 
of contributory infringement online.  The rule would permit blatant 
and obvious infringement to occur even where the OSP provides a 
necessary instrument for the infringement to continue and knows 
that it supports the infringement.  Accepting the Ninth Circuit‘s 
standard is tantamount to giving OSPs Internet immunity. 
In contrast, the Second Circuit‘s standard iterated in Tiffany II 
simply exchanges the product element of the Ives test for services 
without attaching a new tort-based liability element that exceeds 
the traditional boundaries of the test.
175
  Ives imposes liability for 
two types of tortious conduct: intentional and negligent.
176
  
Intentional inducement clearly fits the first category of tortious 
conduct, as does continuing to provide a good or service the party 
knows causes harm.  Providing a product where the party should 
have knowledge that it will result in harm to a third party meets the 
negligence standard.  The attachment of the direct control and 
monitoring element goes beyond the common law tort framework 
that the contributory trademark infringement doctrine was 
designed to implement.  The direct control and monitoring rule 
creates a special category of liability where no special duty existed 
before.  Although Lockheed derives this alleged duty from the 
 
 173 For a summary of the Ninth Circuit‘s holding see supra text accompanying notes 
104–06. 
 174 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 175 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 176 See supra Part I.C.2. 
2012] INTERNET IMMUNITY & TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 959 
 
landlord-tenant context, there is no duty imposed by the common 
law outside that context, which creates this relationship between 
service providers and service recipients.  Moreover, trademark law 
already provides an alternative means of accounting for 
relationships of control—vicarious trademark infringement.  
Vicarious liability can be imposed where there is an ―apparent or 
actual partnership with the infringer or . . . joint ownership or 
control over the infringing product.‖177  Blending the two tests 
together is unnecessary and imposes an undue burden on 
trademark right holders. 
The similarity between the Ives test and the Tiffany II test is 
readily apparent.  The Second Circuit merely replaces the goods 
requirement with a goods or services requirement, preserving the 
use and knowledge standards of the Ives test.
178
  Although the 
Supreme Court may alter this standard within Ives‘s structure, 
there is no indication that an additional element is necessary to 
apply the test in the OSP context.  As the Supreme Court noted 
most recently in Citizens United v. FEC, ―[o]ur precedent is to be 
respected unless the most convincing of reasons demonstrates that 
adherence to it puts us on a course that is sure error.‖179  Common 
law tort principles support liability for those who permit another to 
act tortiously through the use of another‘s premises or 
instrumentality.
180
  Moreover, the Court‘s only other commentary 
on the doctrine was in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.,
181
 soon after the decision in Ives, where it reaffirmed 
the Ives test as the ―narrow standard‖ for contributory trademark 
infringement.
182
  A further narrowing of the standard is unlikely 
because it would violate the Court‘s jurisprudence and remove the 
standard from its grounding in tort law.  Thus, the proper test for 
OSPs is the Second‘s Circuit‘s modified Ives test. 
 
 177 MCCARTHY, supra note 16, at § 25:22. 
 178 Compare Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982), with 
Tiffany II,  600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010). 
 179 130 S. Ct. 876, 911–12 (2010). 
 180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 877(c) (1979) (―For harm resulting to a third 
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . permits the 
other to act upon his premises or with his instrumentalities, knowing or having reason to 
know that the other is acting or will act tortiously.‖). 
 181 466 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984). 
 182 Id. 
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B. The Standard for “Knowledge” 
The knowledge requirement of Ives is based on the common 
law of torts.  This requirement contemplates actual knowledge.  
The ―reason to know‖ requirement is generally meant to ―denote 
the fact that the actor has information from which a person of 
reasonable intelligence or of the superior intelligence of the actor 
would infer that the fact in question exists, or that such person 
would govern his conduct upon the assumption that such fact 
exists.‖183  Therefore, a standard that requires a significantly 
altered construction of the Ives test cannot meet this level of 
knowledge. 
This Note argues that the courts must reject the specific 
knowledge test, the reasonable anticipation test, and the direct 
control and monitoring rule because none of these tests accurately 
reflect the meaning of the knowledge prong.  Instead, this Note 
proposes that existing case law and common law tort principles 
continue to support the willful blindness doctrine as well as an 
additional interpretation of the knowledge prong based on the early 
common law understanding of the doctrine.  The alternative 
interpretation that this Note proposes looks to the Supreme Court‘s 
first iteration of the test in Eli Lilly for instruction.  In Eli Lilly, the 
Court formulated the second prong of the doctrine as the act of 
―designedly enabling‖ a fraud.184  This prong was created to 
encapsulate the English rule: ―whether the defendants have or have 
not knowingly put into the hands of the [direct infringer] the means 
of deceiving the ultimate purchasers.‖185 
First, both the reasonable anticipation and specific knowledge 
requirements, supported respectively by the Third Restatement of 
Unfair Competition and the Second Circuit, should be rejected.  
The principle reason is that both of these standards ignore the on-
going relationship between the two parties that allows the 
infringement to occur and continue to occur through the provision 
of services.  The direct infringer and the party facilitating that 
infringement are not mere strangers in a faceless Internet world.  
 
 183 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 12(1) (1965). 
 184 William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530 (1924). 
 185 N. K. Fairbank Co. v. R. W. Bell Mfg. Co., 77 F. 869, 878 (2d. Cir. 1896) (quoting 
Lever v. Goodwin, 36 Ch. 1 (1887)). 
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Both the reasonable anticipation standard and the specific 
knowledge standard rely too little or too much, respectively, on the 
actions of the trademark right holder to determine liability; rather, 
the focus should be on the actions of and relationship between the 
infringer and alleged contributory infringer.  In Ives, there was no 
discussion of notice to the generic drug manufacturer about the 
pharmacists‘ actions.  In Hard Rock Cafe, the court noted that no 
notice was given to the landlords, but proceeded to elaborate on the 
contours of the willful blindness standard.
186
  The focus of the 
courts was unequivocally tied to the nature of the relationship 
between the manufacturer or landlord and the direct infringer.  
Moreover, the reasonable anticipation and specific knowledge 
standards are unduly burdensome for either the alleged infringer or 
the aggrieved trademark right holder.  The reasonable anticipation 
standard would require hyper-vigilance on the part of OSPs; the 
specific knowledge standard would impose too high a financial 
cost on trademark right holders seeking to preserve their trademark 
rights.  The realities of enforcing the common law protection of the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to OSPs should not 
be ignored in reformulating the doctrine to fit the modern world. 
The test proposed here allows for a more generalized 
knowledge than the specific knowledge bar applied by the Second 
Circuit in Tiffany II, but it is not the generalized knowledge 
standard rejected by that court.  This Note proposes that the 
meaning of the knowledge prong should be interpreted to find 
liability where: (a) knowledge of a particular type of fraud or abuse 
is widespread and (b) the OSP knows or has reason to know that its 
service is a necessary tool that designedly enables third-party 
infringement.  To designedly enable infringement, the service must 
be an essential part of the process in completing the infringement.  
For example, in the case of a credit card processor and infringing 
site, no online sale would occur without the payment processing.  
In the example of an online marketplace like eBay, this knowledge 
standard would impose liability where the design of eBay‘s seller 
platform is an essential part of the process to complete the 
infringement.  The evidence in Tiffany II suggests that eBay‘s 
 
 186 See Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 
1149 (7th Cir. 1992). 
962 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 22:927 
 
system is able to quickly disable infringing listings when reported 
by the trademark holder.
187
  However, its failure to devise a system 
that prevents or limits the ability of infringers to post infringing 
articles in the first place suggests that liability may be imposed 
under this new standard were it applied to a case like Tiffany II.  
This Note acknowledges the difficulties OSPs may experience in 
designing new systems to accommodate the rights of trademark 
holders, but ultimately concludes that OSPs will be able to design 
systems that do not by their very design serve to enable 
infringement without a significant burden to the OSPs. 
In addition, this new standard still allows liability to attach 
under the willful blindness and specific knowledge standards.  
Tiffany II correctly expounded on the requirements of willful 
blindness.  Specific knowledge could still be required where there 
is a lack of information about whether a given type of direct 
infringer is utilizing a service in a particular way or has somehow 
managed to circumvent new measures designed to prevent 
infringing sales.  Where there is genuine ambiguity about whether 
a specified service is facilitating infringement by its very design, 
specific knowledge of infringement is the appropriate standard.  
This standard is correct in this instance because holding a party 
liable for contributory infringement where that party cannot 
identify an infringement would violate the knowledge requirement. 
However, in many instances infringement by the primary 
infringer will be much more obvious.  For example, when web 
sites explicitly state that replicas or fakes with the trademark on the 
items are sold, there is a sufficiently obvious violation and OSPs 
must design systems or methods to root out these violators and 
deny their services to these infringing parties.  These are cases 
where the OSP knows or should know that the product being sold 
is infringing without additional information from the trademark 
right holder.  The Second Circuit clearly believed that the willful 
 
 187 See Tiffany II, 600 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (―For nearly a decade, including the 
period at issue, eBay has also maintained and administered the Verified Rights Owner 
(‗VeRO‘) Program—a notice-and-takedown system allowing owners of intellectual 
property rights including Tiffany, to report to eBay any listing offering potentially 
infringing items, so that eBay could remove such reported listings.‖). 
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blindness standard would cover these types of obvious activity.
188
  
However, many OSPs will not have the same investigatory 
procedures or capabilities in place as eBay did and signs of blatant 
infringement may go unnoticed.  Although the Second Circuit 
accepts the alternative standard of willful blindness, its ultimate 
ruling on knowledge points to the need for the ―designedly 
enabled‖ standard of knowledge as well.  Tiffany II implies that 
once some knowledge of infringing activities is made, the OSP is 
on notice of potential future infringement and must act 
accordingly.
189
  The ―designedly enabled‖ requirement simply 
imposes on OSPs the obligation to make sure they are not actively 
facilitating infringement by providing services in such a way as to 
make infringement as equally likely as legal activity. 
IV. SOLUTIONS OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM 
Although suits for contributory trademark infringement are one 
strategy trademark holders may pursue, they are unlikely to deter 
or stop the sale of counterfeit products absent a change in the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine.  Alternative avenues 
for trademark protection may in fact yield greater results in 
tackling the problem.  One such strategy is to collaborate with 
credit card processors and payment processors to cut off the 
primary payment methods utilized by counterfeiters.  Another 
solution is to change the norms surrounding intellectual property 
violations by increasing both the ability of customs and other law 
enforcement personnel to identify counterfeits and arrest violators 
and the criminal punishment for offenders. 
A. An Uneasy Marriage: Credit Card Processors and Trademark 
Holders 
A coalition between payment processors and trademark holders 
may provide the easiest means to shut down counterfeit sites and 
sellers on auction sites.  Payment processors are increasingly aware 
of their potential liability under the theory of contributory 
trademark infringement.  The dissent by Judge Kozinski in Perfect 
 
 188 See id. at 109. 
 189 Id. at 109–10. 
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10
190
 suggests that payment processors may have plenty to worry 
about in the future from trademark holders seeking to shut down 
infringing Internet sellers.  Kozinski applied Lockheed‘s service 
test and determined that ―credit cards are directly involved in every 
infringing transaction; not only do they process the payment for 
virtually every sale . . . they control whether such transactions will 
go forward.  This is more than enough to establish ‗control and 
monitoring.‘‖191  Presumably circuits that require a lesser degree of 
knowledge would have an easier time finding liability. 
Furthermore, the Southern District of New York in Gucci 
America, Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp.
192
 determined that a 
credit card processor could be liable under the Second Circuit‘s 
theory of contributory trademark infringement.
193
  The district 
court noted that the sale of infringing goods wholly depended on 
the provision of credit card services by the defendants, relying on 
Judge Kozinski‘s reasoning in Perfect 10 that ―[i]n a commercial 
environment, distribution and payment are . . . like love and 
marriage—you can‘t have one without the other.  If cards don‘t 
process payments, pirates don‘t deliver booty.‖194  Even if the 
direct control and monitoring rule were to continue to be applied 
by the courts, the reasoning of courts could begin to follow that of 
Judge Kozinski‘s realistic approach to online infringement. 
Credit card and payment processors are likely to heed the 
warning.  One instructive example is that of payment processors 
and child pornography sites.  Child pornography, like 
counterfeiting, is a multi-billion dollar industry that has grown 
with the success of the Internet due to the ease of access to illicit 
material and the ability to pay by credit card or payment 
processor.
195
  Although child pornography is clearly a different and 
more obvious form of exploitation, the same principle of ―shutting 
 
 190 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 191 Id. at 822 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 192 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
 193 Id. at 249–50. 
 194 Id. at 253 (quoting Perfect 10, 494 F.3d at 818 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
 195 The Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography—Fact Sheet, NAT‘L CTR. FOR 
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.missingkids.com/missing 
kids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=3703 [hereinafter Fact 
Sheet]. 
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down the money‖ applies where money is the major reason the 
illicit market thrives online and criminal enforcement of the laws is 
difficult if not impossible. 
One group that has sought to ―shut down the money‖ is the 
Financial Coalition Against Child Pornography (―the Coalition‖), 
which promotes best practices for preventing and detecting child 
pornography in order to remove child pornography merchants from 
payment and credit card processor services.
196
  The Coalition has 
as its members most major credit card processors, Internet pay 
processors like PayPal, and the domain registrar GoDaddy.com, 
Inc.
197
  The recommended approach involves gathering 
information about the proposed business, screening merchants, and 
requiring identifying background information on owners before 
pay services are provided to ensure they are legitimate sellers.
198
  
Some follow-up monitoring of the sites is recommended; however, 
the principle mechanism is a preventative one.
199
 
This approach does not require payment processors to maintain 
constant vigilance.  Instead, this approach requires due diligence 
from processors seeking to enter a business relationship with a web 
site that wants the ability to receive payment from customers.  The 
same level of due diligence for proposed counterfeit sites is likely 
to reduce the ability of illicit sellers to reach customers.  Requiring 
that payment processers and OSPs perform some due diligence on 
those utilizing their services is clearly a fair bargain to make when 
many sites and sellers openly brand themselves as offering fakes, 
replicas, and copies. 
B. Changing Norms and a Role for Law Enforcement in 
Intellectual Property Crimes 
The criminalization of intellectual property crimes was a 
decision made by Congress; however, difficulties in enforcing 
these penalties have reduced the deterrent value of these criminal 
 
 196 FIN. COAL. AGAINST CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, Internet Merchant Acquisition and 
Monitoring Best Practices for the Prevention and Detection of Commercial Child 
Pornography, FDIC (May 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2007/ 
fil07072a.pdf. 
 197 Fact Sheet, supra note 195.  
 198 Id. at 2–7. 
 199 Id. at 8–10. 
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penalties to almost nothing.
200
  President Obama‘s White Paper 
provides guidelines for increasing the deterrent effectiveness of 
criminal penalties for counterfeiting offenses.
201
  These 
recommendations include increasing statutory maxima and 
sentencing ranges, increasing law enforcement and rights holders‘ 
access to pre-seizure and post-seizure information, increasing 
pharmaceutical regulations, permitting voluntary disclosures of 
infringing products to relieve an unwitting party of liability, and 
strengthening CBP‘s authority to issue penalties.202  Although 
these are small steps, they will increase the ability of law 
enforcement and rights holders to successfully identify 
infringements and carry out the law.  A collaborative approach that 
allows rights holders to identify infringing products quickly will 
boost CBP‘s ability to act swiftly against infringing importers.  
Increased penalties will also make the lucrative counterfeit 
business less attractive to some offenders and keep more offenders 
off the streets or the web for a longer time period. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is an 
increasingly important tool for trademark holders fighting the sale 
of counterfeit goods online.  Pursuing direct infringers is both 
costly and meaningless where the global scale of trademark 
infringement barely allows trademark owners to put a dent in 
infringing sales.  Alternatives to civil suits in the form of coalitions 
between brand owners and payment processors or increased CBP 
enforcement capacity may be essential to stemming the flow of 
illicit goods.  Ultimately, this Note proposes that certainty 
regarding the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement will 
allow trademark holders to make smart choices in defending their 
brands online, and allow OSPs to protect against allegations by 
creating and designing new systems to prevent infringement that 
comply with the law.  The doctrine must also prove to be workable 
in the context of the Internet because the number of goods sold 
online and imported into the United States continues to grow and, 
 
 200 See supra text accompanying notes 6–43. 
 201 WHITE PAPER, supra note 44, at 1. 
 202 Id. at 1–3. 
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for practical and jurisdictional reasons, the only recourse 
trademark holders will have is the contributory infringement 
doctrine.  The flow of counterfeit products is likely to increase as 
the profits to be gained are great and the current penalties, both 
penal and financial, are limited.  Stopping the flow of products is 
only possible if OSPs bear some of the responsibility for limiting 
direct infringers capacity to infringe. 
Part III of this Note argues that the courts should universally 
adopt the modified Ives standard, and reject the ―direct control and 
monitoring rule‖ of the Ninth Circuit.  Ignoring the common law 
underlying the Ives decision would remove the justification for 
imposing any liability for contributory trademark infringement.  
The courts must adopt a rule that complies with common law 
precedent and protects the traditional rights held by trademark 
owners.  Treating OSPs under a special category of liability 
because of the new and unique nature of the Internet does a 
disservice to both right holders and consumers who rely upon 
trademark owners to protect their mark and keep infringing 
materials out of the marketplace.  OSPs must share their portion of 
the responsibility where they intentionally or negligently allow 
infringement to continue through the use of their services.  
Therefore, interpreting the knowledge prong to include knowledge 
of widespread infringement with a service that designedly enables 
the primary infringer is both more consistent with historical 
precedent and better able to respond to the realities of infringement 
in the modern age.   
Although there may be alternatives to a robust contributory 
infringement test, as discussed in Part IV, these alternatives should 
be viewed as additional methods for stopping the ever-increasing 
flow of online infringement.  The courts must adapt the 
contributory trademark infringement doctrine to the realities of 
Internet based infringement—not by altering the test, but by 
understanding the underlying nature of OSPs as infringement 
enablers.  OSPs must design their services or perform due 
diligence to ensure that they provide services based on a system 
that does not ignore or actively enable tortious conduct.  The costs 
of Internet immunity for OSPs to consumers and right holders alike 
should be measured against the benefit of freeing OSPs from 
liability for all contributory trademark infringement suits.   The 
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law must adapt to the realities of online infringement.  If not, the 
dual purposes of the trademark law—to protect customers and 
brands alike—will be forever lost in favor of counterfeiters, 
pirates, and all those who designedly enable infringement. 
